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Abstract 
Interconnection rates are a key variable in telecommunications markets. Every call that is placed 
must be terminated by the network of the receiving party, thus the termination end has the 
characteristic of an economic bottleneck and is subject to regulation in many countries. This 
paper examines the impact of regulatory intervention to cut termination rates of calls to mobile 
phones. We argue that regulatory cuts should have a differential impact according to the type of 
tariff the mobile customer subscribes to. While all mobile customers may pay higher prices 
because of a “waterbed” effect, termination rates also affect competition among mobile operators. 
We show that the waterbed effect is diluted, but not eliminated, for customers with pre-paid 
cards, where regulation also acts as impediment to “raise-each-other’s-cost” collusive strategies 
that mobile networks can adopt. The waterbed effect is instead strongest for consumers with 
monthly (post-paid) subscription contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
The  prices  mobile  operators  charge  other  (fixed  or  mobile)  network  operators  for 
connecting calls to their subscribers have become a hotly debated issue among regulators and 
academics worldwide. These are called termination charges, and correspond to wholesale 
price agreements among network operators. Hence, these fees are not paid by retail customers 
directly, but feed indirectly into their bills. The level of termination charges is perceived to be 
high both in absolute terms, but also in relation to similar prices charged by fixed operators. 
Industry analysts stress that such charges play a critical role and may inhibit the growth of 
telecommunications services in general. Moreover, especially regarding the fixed to mobile 
(F2M) termination rates, a large theoretical literature has demonstrated that, independently of 
the intensity of competition for mobile customers, mobile operators have an incentive to set 
charges that will extract the largest possible surplus from fixed users.
3
 This fear provided 
justification for regulatory intervention to cut these rates. However, reducing the level of 
F2M termination charges can potentially increase the level of prices for mobile subscribers, 
causing what is known as the “waterbed” or “seesaw” effect. 
Genakos and Valletti (2010) (henceforth, GV) document empirically the existence and 
magnitude  of  the  waterbed  phenomenon  using  a  uniquely  constructed  panel  of  mobile 
operators’ prices across more than twenty countries over six years. Their results suggest that, 
although regulation reduced termination rates by about 10% to the benefit of callers to mobile 
phones from fixed lines, this also led to a 5% increase (varying between 2% 15% depending 
on the estimate) in mobile retail prices. While GV provide evidence of this phenomenon, 
their analysis falls short of showing the precise channels that may have lead to an increase in 
mobile retail bills following regulatory cuts of termination rates. In fact, mobile termination 
regulation  affects  F2M  calls,  but  will  also  have  an  effect  on  mobile to mobile  (M2M) 
termination rates. The level of M2M termination rates impacts on the cost of both making and 
receiving  calls  and,  overall,  on  the  intensity  of  competition  for  the  market  of  mobile 
customers. Hence, the “pure” waterbed effect from F2M calls will coexist with, and possibly 
be confounded by, the effects from M2M calls. 
This particular feature has been analyzed in a burgeoning literature on “two way” access 
charges, which is where M2M termination belongs. This literature, initiated by the seminal 
works  of  Armstrong  (1998)  and  Laffont  et  al.  (1998),  has  shown  how  the  impact  of 
termination rates on retail prices is subtle, as it depends on the type of contracts that operators 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Armstrong (2002), Wright (2002), Vogelsang (2003), and Valletti and Houpis (2005). 3 
 
can  offer  to  their  customers.  Typically,  high  (reciprocal)  termination  deals  can  have  a 
“collusive” effect of sustaining high retail prices and profits when operators compete in linear 
prices. This result collapses, and can actually be reversed, when competition is in two part 
tariffs, and operators set  differential charges according to  whether the call is  destined to 
consumers of the same operator (“on net” calls), or belonging to rivals (“off net” calls). 
In  this  paper  we  first  synthesize  the  literature  on  two way  access  charges.  We  then 
discuss  the  impact  that  regulation  of  mobile  termination  rates  should  have  on  mobile 
customers’ bills, distinguishing between the pure (or direct) waterbed effect from F2M calls 
and the strategic (indirect) effect of regulation through its impact on the price of M2M calls. 
We derive two hypotheses that we then test empirically. In particular, we discuss how the 
waterbed  effect  is  expected  to  be  strong  for  mobile  customers  subscribing  to  non linear 
monthly  contracts  (post paid)  and  be  particularly  strong  on  the  fixed  component  of  the 
contract, while it should be diluted for customers with pre paid cards (pay as you go). We 
find  strong  support  for  both  hypotheses,  highlighting  the  importance  of  these  direct  and 
indirect channels, and of taking into consideration the structure of tariffs when examining the 
waterbed phenomenon in mobile telephony. 
It is important to emphasize that most of the literature at this early stage is, in fact, 
theoretical in nature. Very few works have endeavoured empirical investigations, despite the 
very  practical  problem  underlying  the  entire  interconnection  analysis.  Besides  GV, 
Cunningham et al. (2010) and Dewenter and Kruse (2011) represent exceptions.
4 We do not 
attempt here to provide guidance as to the optimal level of mobile termination rates, and we 
do not conduct any welfare analysis. Rather, our main scope is more limited but nevertheless 
relevant  for  policy.  We  want  to  see  if  we  can  find  support  in  the  data  for  some  basic 
predictions from the literature on the impact on mobile customers’ bills due to the regulation 
of termination rates. Should we find this evidence, then one way of reading our results is that 
                                                 
4 Cunnigham et al. (2010) also find evidence of the waterbed effect in a cross section of countries. This is also 
the conclusion of Dewenter and Kruse (2011), although they follow an indirect approach, as they test the impact 
of termination regulation on diffusion of mobile telephony, rather than looking directly at the impact on mobile 
prices. Since the waterbed effect predicts that high termination rates should be associated with low mobile 
prices, it also predicts that diffusion will be faster in those markets with high termination rates, which is what 
Dewenter and Kruse (2011) find. Growitsch et al. (2010) instead find no evidence of the waterbed effect using 
an alternative dataset (Merrill Lynch). However, they derive prices of mobile consumers by dividing total (voice 
service based) revenues by minutes, when total revenues include also the revenues from termination of calls. So, 
they essentially regress price on a component of price (termination rates) and without appropriately correcting 
for this endogeneity problem, unsurprisingly, they find a positive relationship. Hence, we believe that Growitsch 
et al. (2010) do not find the waterbed effect not because they are using a different dataset, but because their 
empirical implementation is incorrect. More empirical works are emerging now in the related field of “two 
sided” markets, e.g., Jin and Rysman (2010). 4 
 
the more theoretical approaches are indeed  very useful in assisting regulators and policy 
makers when regulating termination rates.  
The whole paper rests on the idea that mobile termination regulation affects both F2M 
calls and M2M calls. Regulation typically works via the setting of caps, i.e., operators may 
actually set termination charges below the cap, if they wish to do so. In fact, the literature that 
we review below makes such a distinction, finding that, while mobile firms always have an 
incentive to set unregulated “high” F2M termination charges, under some circumstances they 
would  set  profit maximising  “low”  M2M  termination charges.  If that was  the  case,  then 
regulation would be binding only on F2M charges, and its effects would show up only via the 
direct waterbed effect. However, in practice, regulation is binding both for F2M and M2M 
termination rates, as mobile operators would find it impossible to sustain differences in their 
termination rates, because of arbitrage possibilities. In other words, either both M2M and 
F2M  termination  rates are  forced  by  regulation  to  be  set  at  the  same level,  or  arbitrage 
possibilities  force  them  to  be  so,  as  discussed  in  Armstrong  and  Wright  (2009).  France 
provides a particularly fitting example of the close relationship between these two wholesale 
termination charges, and the possibility of arbitrage. Prior to 2005, M2M termination was set 
using  a  bill and keep  system.  With  bill and keep,  calls  are  billed  to  customers,  but 
termination charges are forgone on a reciprocal basis, without any billing process between 
telecom providers. Effectively, bill and keep corresponds to zero M2M termination charges. 
These (zero) charges were much lower than the termination charges for F2M calls set at the 
time. The discrepancy in the rates attracted arbitrageurs, using the so called GSM gateways. 
Basically, under the bill and keep regime, fixed operators could cut their costs by routing all 
the F2M traffic via a GSM gateway, and by doing so avoid the F2M termination charge, and 
instead take advantage of bill and keep interconnection between mobile GSM operators.
5 As 
a  response to this, the French mobile operators abandoned the bill and keep  system, and 
effectively  set  the  rates  for  termination  of  M2M  calls  to  the  same  level  of  F2M  calls. 
Arbitrage  thus  limits,  or  even  eliminates,  the  ability  to  set  differential  (lower)  rates  for 
terminating M2M calls compared to F2M calls. As regulatory authorities across the EU and 
                                                 
5 In more detail, a GSM gateway is a mobile phone installed at a fixed location. It is equipped with SIM cards of 
various national mobile operators. Fixed line subscribers can call that GSM gateway on a value added service 
number to save money on direct F2M calls. The GSM gateway forwards the call to the operator who runs the 
mobile telephone number the fixed subscriber wants to call. The operator of the GSM gateway just incurs the 
cost of a mobile on net call as the GSM gateway automatically chooses the “correct” SIM card. The business 
model  is  thus  built  on  arbitrage  between  retail  prices  for  F2M  calls  (and  indirectly  rates  for  mobile  call 
termination)  on the  one  hand and retail prices for  mobile on net calls  on the other hand.  In France, GSM 
gateways are called “hrisson” (“hedgehog”). 5 
 
the rest of the world pushed mobile termination rates downwards over time, probably driven 
by the desire to make F2M calls cheaper, they also had de facto an impact on M2M calls. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we re assess the waterbed effect question, 
taking into account that the overall impact of regulation of termination rates will balance both 
effects arising from F2M and M2M calls. While the first effect should push up mobile retail 
prices, the latter is less clear, and will depend on the type of tariff. Section 3 describes our 
empirical strategy and section 4 discusses the data used. Sections 5 and 6 present the results 
and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The theory of two-way access charges and the waterbed effect 
To fix ideas, follow the call made by a customer of the fixed network F to a customer of 
the  mobile  operator  M.  This  call,  to  be  completed,  uses  network  M  as  its  termination 
segment. In all European countries, and also in most of the world, there is a calling party pays 
system (CPP) in place.
6 Under CPP, the call is paid for by the caller to the mobile phone, not 
by  the  mobile  phone  owner.  Operator  F  thus  must  buy  termination  services  only  from 
operator M as no other operator can complete this call. Therefore, the termination segment of 
the call presents itself as an economic bottleneck for the buying operator F. 
This distortion implies that the mobile operator is typically able to set termination charges 
at  the  monopoly  level,  independently  of  the  intensity  of  competition  in  the  market  for 
subscribers. The level of termination charges is determined by the same trade off made by a 
monopoly firm: by setting higher termination prices it increases the unit margin it can earn, 
but it also reduces the quantities of calls received. 
This problem has been extensively analyzed in the literature, which has concluded that 
there is a need to regulate mobile termination charges (Gans and King, 2000; Armstrong, 
2002; Wright, 2002). This has been the main concern of regulatory authorities and, indeed, 
many regulators have intervened to cut termination rates. 
What is the effect of a cut of mobile termination charges, below the level that would have 
been set by unregulated mobile firms? Consider again the example of F calling M. Clearly, 
the price of F2M calls would become cheaper after a cut of termination charges. This is 
arguably the core aspect regulators have typically been interested in. However, there is also 
                                                 
6  The  U.S.  is  a  noticeable  exception  in  that  there  is  a  RPP  (receiving  party  pays)  system  in  place. 
Interconnection rates are very low, not because of market forces, but because of the intervention of the FCC (for 
instance, termination on a mobile network is regulated at the same long run incremental cost of termination on 
an incumbent fixed network). 6 
 
another effect predicted by all the theoretical models: the total bill paid by M will go up as a 
result of the cut of the termination charge. This is the “waterbed effect”. 
The idea behind the waterbed effect is intuitive. The mobile network is a platform that 
chooses two sets of prices, those for making calls (paid by own customers) and those for 
terminating  calls  (paid by  other  customers).
7  Since  a  mobile  network  is  a  bottleneck for 
received calls, money can be made over termination. Thus, each potential mobile customer 
comes  with  a  termination  rent.  This  does  not  imply,  however,  that  mobile  firms  will 
necessarily make supernormal profits overall. In fact, if there is enough competition among 
mobile networks, then competition will exhaust this rent, and operators will offer subsidized 
prices  to  their  mobile  customers.  Here,  the  subsidy  is  paid  by  fixed  users  F,  which  are 
charged high prices, to the benefit of mobile customers M. If regulation cuts somehow the 
termination rent, then the subsidy to mobile customers will be reduced too. In the limiting 
case, no subsidy could be given at all to consumers if regulation eliminates entirely any 
termination rent. The bill paid by M will then go up. 
As  shown  by  several  authors,  a  waterbed  effect  exists  under  quite  general  market 
conditions.
8 The prediction from the theory can be stated as: 
 




where P is the average total bill of a mobile customer for a given usage profile, and T
F is the 
F2M termination rate. Since T
F affects only the price of F2M calls,
9 there is no obvious effect 
on call prices, while most of the waterbed effect would arise from the fixed component paid 
by the user, at least for those customers on a post paid deal. Eq. (1) is the main prediction 
tested by GV, namely that lower termination rates induced by regulation should be associated 




                                                 
7  In  this  paper  we  concentrate  on  voice  calls,  although  our  arguments  apply  also  to  other  forms  of 
communications enabled by mobile devices, e.g., text messages. See Andersson et al. (2009) and Basalisco 
(2010) for an empirical analysis of the interaction between voice and text messages. 
8 See in particular Wright (2002), section V, and GV, section 2.1. 
9 The “other” way  of a bi directional communication, from the  mobile  network  M to the incumbent fixed 
network F, has always been regulated in every country, at the long run incremental cost of the fixed network. 
Thus a change on the mobile termination rate has no impact on the cost that M pays to terminate calls to F. 7 
 
2.1 M2M calls and the structure of tariffs 
The  call  termination  problem  described  in  the  previous  sections is  relevant  when  the 
market of callers from fixed networks is separate from the market of receivers on mobile 
networks.  However,  mobile  firms  also  interconnect  with  each  other.  There  is  therefore 
another termination  rate,  for  M2M  calls,  that  we  have  to  take  into consideration.  In  this 
section we first analyze the impact of M2M termination rates on mobile retail prices, when 
considered completely in isolation from F2M termination rates that we dealt with in section 
2. We then put these two sets of results together. 
Let us start with M2M calls. Imagine mobile operators M1 and M2 compete for the same 
customer base that both originates and terminates calls. As long as operators M1 and M2 
command some market share, operator M1 needs interconnection with M2 to terminate the 
calls  that  M1’s  customers  destine  to  M2’s  customers  and  vice  versa.  There  is  a  sort  of 
“double  coincidence  of  wants”  that  potentially  makes  the  bottleneck  problem  less 
problematic.  In  a  symmetric  situation,  termination  charges  may  even  be  thought  to  be 
irrelevant since M1 pays M2 the same amount it receives from M2. However, this reasoning 
is not entirely correct. When termination charges are negotiated jointly, two kinds of potential 
problems emerge: 
 
a)  Operators  can  agree  to  set  access  charges  at  a  level  that  eliminates  any  effective 
competition among them; and 
b)  Termination based discrimination creates forms of externalities that may be used to 
affect the intensity of competition. 
 
As  extensively  analyzed  by  the  literature  on  “two way”  access  charges  following 
Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998), different results arise according to the type of 
tariffs  offered  by  competing  mobile  firms.
10  Take  the  following  multi part  tariff  as  a 
reference point: 
 
(2)  off off on on off on q p q p F p p F P + + = ) , , (  
 
                                                 
10 See Hoernig (2009) and Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010) for a comprehensive treatment of the most recent 
literature, with a particular emphasis on the implications for the waterbed effect. In particular, while most of the 
theoretical  literature  concerns  duopoly  models,  Hoernig  (2009)  shows  how  the  basic  predictions  that  we 
formulate below do generalise to models with an arbitrary number of sufficiently symmetric networks. 8 
 
where P is again the average total bill of a mobile customer for a given usage profile, F is the 
fixed fee of the customer’s multi part tariff, pon is the on net price for calls made to customers 
belonging to the same network, poff is off net price for calls made to customers belonging to 
other networks, qon is the average on net traffic, and qoff is the average off net traffic. 
When  firms  compete  in  simple  linear  prices  (which  are  relevant  for  pre paid  cards), 
collusive retail prices can be sustained using high termination charges because of a “raise 
each other’s  cost”  effect.  To  see  this,  imagine  what  happens  when  operators  charge 
monopoly  retail  prices  to  customers.  This  can  be  an  equilibrium  only  if  no  one  has  a 
unilateral  incentive  to  deviate.  If  one firm  deviates  from  the  monopoly  retail charges  by 
undercutting the rival, it induces its subscribers to call more. Since parts of the calls made are 
destined to the rival’s network, the effect of a price cut is to send out more calls than it 
receives from the rival. The resulting net outflow of calls has an associated deficit that is 
particularly burdensome if the termination charge is high. This will discourage under pricing 
in the first place. If we call T
M the termination rate between mobile networks, in the case of 
competition in linear prices we have the following prediction of an increase of termination 
rates (starting, say, from termination rates set at cost as a benchmark): 
 




and a similar positive effect on profits, while there is obviously no prediction on the fixed 
component F since we are dealing with linear tariffs. 
This  collusive  result  disappears  when  firms  compete  in  multi-part  tariffs  (which  are 
relevant particularly for post paid contracts). When firms compete in uniform two part tariffs 
(which  do  not  distinguish  between  calls  placed  on net  and  off net),  there  is  a  “profit 
neutrality” result of termination charges on profits. It is still true that a high termination 
charge feeds into high retail call charges. However, all the profits generated from termination 
are used to lower the fixed component. Hence, in this case, the waterbed effect would be 
neutral  on  profits  and  on  the  total  bill;  however  it  would  still  be  at  work  on  the  fixed 
component of the two part tariff:
11 
 
                                                 
11 Where P in the first inequality is the total bill of a mobile customer that includes both the fixed fee as well as 
the variable price per call paid. 9 
 














Finally, when firms can discriminate between on net and off net calls, they can reach 
higher profits by setting low (below cost) termination charges. This is because tariff mediated 
externalities  are  generated  any  time  the  termination  charge  is  set  different  from  its  cost, 
thereby generating differences between on net and off net prices. Firms can exploit this, and 
would compete less aggressively for the market when termination charges are set below cost. 
Essentially, customers prefer to belong to small networks in this case, as they would place 
relatively more off net calls, which are cheaper than on net calls. When instead termination 
charges are set above cost, off net prices increase but the competitive externality effect is 
particularly strong on the fixed fee and this is the prevailing effect on the bill: 
 














How does this discussion fit with the regulation of F2M termination rates? In that case, 
recall that our prediction was simply given by eq. (1),   i.e.,  0 < F dT
dP
. 
As said in the Introduction, in practice F2M calls can be converted into M2M calls by 
some  special  equipment  (GSM  gateways,  see  footnote  5  for  details  about  the  arbitrage 
technique). Then, if there are large discrepancies between T
F and T
M, there can be arbitrage 
possibilities. Even if regulation only caps termination rates in general, in that M2M rates 
could be set lower if mobile operators wished to do so, arbitrage implies that these two 
charges will be set at the same level. Thus regulation, even if it formally sets a cap only, it 
effectively affects T
F and T
M, which will be both set at the same (capped) level. The “pure” 
waterbed effect from F2M calls can be then confounded by the indirect strategic M2M effects 
we described above.  
Thus  imagine  that  regulation affects  all  termination  charges, either  because  operators 
would have set all termination charges above the regulated level, or because any difference 
would otherwise attract arbitrageurs to exploit the differential. The main waterbed prediction 
given by eq. (1) would then be additionally affected by the effects summarized by the various 
eq. (3) (5), according to the relevant structure of mobile tariffs. We consider each case in 
turn. 10 
 
Let  us  start  from  the  case  of  competition  in  linear  prices.  As  far  as  M2M  rates  are 
concerned,  this  is  when  the  theory  predicts  that  firms  would  collude  by  setting  “high” 
termination rates. Thus, if regulation cuts also M2M rates, then firms can collude “less”, and 
bills will go down from this side, which contrasts the pure waterbed effect. 
We turn next to competition in two part tariffs when there is no discrimination between 
on net and off net prices. The theory predicts that the higher the termination rate, the more 
expensive  calls  per  minute,  but  the  lower  the  fixed  fee.  Thus  the  effect  on  the  fixed 
component of an increase of the termination rate is negative, which reinforces the waterbed 
effect that would be already arising from F2M calls. The total bill and profits are instead 
unaffected as far as M2M calls are concerned (while there is still the “pure” waterbed effect 
arising from F2M calls). 
Finally,  consider  when  firms  compete  in  multi part  discriminatory  tariffs.  If  M2M 
termination is set equal to F2M termination, it will be set “high” compared to the otherwise 
collusive one for M2M calls alone. Regulation of termination, by cutting this rate, would 
therefore get closer to the profit maximising M2M charge. Therefore, we have additional 
effects which strengthen the waterbed on the total bill, in particular via the impact on the 
fixed fee of the multi part tariff paid by the customer. 
 
2.2 Empirical predictions 
Table  1  below  summarizes  the  theoretical  discussion.  The  column  ‘F2M’  reports  the 
standard pure waterbed effect (our focus in section 2), when F2M calls are insulated from 
M2M calls. The column ‘M2M’ reports the theoretical predictions arising from M2M calls 
alone (our focus in section 2.1). The column ‘Total Effect’ reports the overall effect arising 
when a single termination rate effectively affects all types of calls, which is the empirically 
relevant case in the presence of arbitrage. As it can be seen, the waterbed effect on the total 
bill is reinforced for post paid contracts, and shows particularly via the impact on the fixed 
fee. On the contrary, there is a countervailing force for pre paid deals. 
In our data, we have price information divided into pre pay and post pay contracts. Pre 
paid cards can reasonably be approximated by linear charges in the relevant range, in contrast 
with more sophisticated schemes (non linear, i.e., with quantity discounts) that correspond 
more closely to post pay contracts. Within post pay contracts, we also have a further split 
between the fixed amount and the variable amount spent on calls. Thus, by looking at the 
structure of tariffs, we may get an additional idea on whether mobile termination regulation 
has also an additional impact via M2M calls. For contracts which can be approximated by a 11 
 
multi part tariff, we can split the waterbed effect on the total bill and on the fixed component 
of the multi part tariff. If M2M calls play a role, then the waterbed effect should be even 
stronger on the fixed fee. When firms offer simple linear prices, proxied by pre paid deals, 
instead, the waterbed effect is diluted by the collusive effect.
All in all, the waterbed predictions are quite robust, also when M2M calls are brought 
into the picture. The additional empirical predictions on the waterbed effect that we bring to a 
test in this paper are on the type of contracts and on the structure of prices. Since regulation 
of  mobile  termination  rates  has  an  impact  on  both  F2M  and  M2M  calls  together,  we 
formulate the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1. The waterbed effect is stronger for post paid contracts and weaker for pre paid deals. 
H2.  Among  post paid  contracts,  the  waterbed  effect  should  prevail  particularly  via  a 
change of the fixed component of the contract. 
 
3. Empirical specification 
The most natural way to analyze the impact of regulation on retail prices in different 
countries over time is through a difference in difference specification:  
 
(6)  lnPujct = αujc + αt + β1Regulationjct + εujct 
 
The dependent variable in (6) is the logarithm of the total bill (lnPujct) for the usage profile 
u = {low, medium, high} of operator j in country c in quarter t. The main variable of interest, 
Regulationjct, is a binary indicator variable that takes the value one in the quarters when 
mobile termination rates are regulated.
12  
We estimate equation (6) separately for pre paid and post paid users. For post paid users, 
we also estimate a variant of equation (6) where the dependent variable, instead of being the 
total bill Pujct, is divided between the fixed fee Fixedujct and the variable component Voiceujct, 




                                            
12 In GV we explicitly model the impact of termination regulation on retail prices, also distinguishing between 
countries that  have  introduced substantial  price cuts  in  termination rates  and countries  that  have  regulated 
termination  too  but  only  mildly,  showing  that  the  waterbed  effect  is  positive  and  significant  in  all  cases. 
Unfortunately, the dataset used for the current paper is a much smaller one (less than a third of the data in the 
“best deals” case) forcing us to utilize a simpler specification, where regulation only enters as a binary indicator.  
 12 
 
of the multi part tariff. The fixed fee corresponds to traffic insensitive charges of the bill, 
while the variable component accounts for all traffic sensitive charges (where naturally Pujct = 
Fixedujct + Voiceujct). 
Regression  (6)  constitutes  a  difference in difference  model,  where  countries  that 
introduced  the  regulation  are  the “treated”  group,  while  non reforming  countries  (always 
regulated or always unregulated) are the “control” group. Due to the inclusion of usage 
country operator and time fixed effects, the impact of regulation on prices is identified from 
countries that introduced this regulation and measures the effect of regulation in reforming 
countries compared to the general evolution of prices or profits in non reforming countries. 
The “waterbed” prediction is that, ceteris paribus, the coefficient on regulation should have a 
positive sign in (6).  
This difference in difference specification allows us to control for time invariant country 
operator characteristics that may influence both regulation and prices. Importantly, it allows 
us  to  control  for  cost  differences  across  mobile  operators  due  to  differential  access  to 
spectrum frequencies (e.g., some operators have access to 900 MHz spectrum, others only to 
1800 MHz) or differences in the cost of network deployment. It also accounts for differences 
among the consumer profiles (e.g., the intensity of competition for heavy users may differ 
from competition for light users). Furthermore, the specification also accounts for common 
global trends, such as changes in technological progress and general awareness and success 
of mobile services. Therefore we ask if, over and above these effects, regulation of mobile 
termination rates had an impact on bills of mobile subscribers. 
There  are  three  important  assumptions  underlying  our  empirical  specification:  (a) 
exogeneity of the regulation variable, (b) any bargaining (or lobbying) process between firms 
and  the  regulatory  authority  did  not  alter  the  overall  impact  of  regulation  on  prices,  (c) 
regulation  was  non selectively  imposed  across  countries.  GV  discuss  extensively  the 
theoretical justification and empirical validity of these assumptions. Since we utilize part of 
their dataset for this paper, we refer the interested reader to the discussion in GV and do not 
repeat the arguments here. 
 
4. Data  
Our data come from two main sources. Firstly, we use Cullen International (which collects 
all termination rates for official use of the European Commission) and various other industry 
and regulatory publications, to identify the dates in which regulation was introduced across 13 
 
countries and operators. Overall, operators from twenty four countries
13 are included in our 
sample. 
The second data source is from Teligen, which provides quarterly information on the total 
bills (and its components: fixed and voice) paid by mobile consumers across operators and 
countries between 2002Q3 and 2006Q1. Teligen collects and compares all available tariffs of 
the  two  largest  mobile  operators  for  thirty  OECD  countries.  It  constructs  three  different 
hypothetical consumer usage profiles (heavy, medium and low) based on the number of calls 
and messages, the average call length, and the time and type of call. These consumer profiles 
are  then  held  fixed  when  looking  across  countries  and  time.  Therefore,  our  unit  of 
observation is the total bill charged to a consumer type, at a certain quarter, by an operator in 
a country who may or may not be regulated. 
Teligen reports information on the “best deals” available to each consumer profile each 
quarter from these mobile operators. These best deals are the cheapest overall tariff for each 
profile, which could be either pay as you go (pre paid) or monthly subscription (post paid) 
contracts.  Teligen  also  reports  separately  information  on  the  cheapest  pre paid  and  the 
cheapest  post paid  contracts,  again  for  each  profile.  Essentially,  the  “best  deals”  are  the 
overall envelope of the best pre paid and the best post paid deals.
14 
To make comparisons homogenous, all consumer prices were converted to euros using 
the Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) currency conversions published by the OECD. However, 
none of our results depends on this transformation. Table 2 provides the summary statistics 
for the key variables used.  
The Teligen dataset has two main advantages regarding our empirical question. First, by 
fixing the calling profiles of customers, it provides us with information on the best choices of 
these customers across countries and time. Second, the total bills reported in this dataset 
include much of the relevant information for this industry, such as inclusive minutes, quantity 
discounts, etc. However, this richness of information comes at the cost of having data for 






                                 
13  The  countries  in  the  sample  include:  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and UK. 
14 Somehow in line with the intuition, low usage profiles are typically best served by pre paid deals, while post 
paid contracts are better suited for heavy usage profiles. However, there are significant exceptions in the data. 
As can been seen in the first panel of Table 2 (Best Deals), the split between post paid and pre paid contracts 
overall is almost equal in size. 14 
 
only the two biggest operators of every country at each point in time (although they cover 80 
percent  of  the  market  on  average  in  our  data).  This  reduces  the  variability  and  makes 
identification of our variables of interest harder, especially given that the biggest mobile 
operators in a given country are often regulated in similar way. A final important limitation of 
the Teligen data is that these are not actual end user bills, but hypothetical baskets based on a 
number of assumptions.
15 However, the very fact that it is a hypothetical basket based on a 
number of characteristics (number and length of calls, etc.) that are fixed a-priori is also its 
strength, because it allows a meaningful comparison across time and countries.
16 
Our results also have to be qualified as termination rents could be exhausted with non 
price strategies as well, i.e., increasing advertising, or giving handset subsidies that we cannot 
control for. However, we do not expect handset subsidies effects to be relevant at all for pre 
paid customers, while in some countries operators practice inter temporal subsidies for post 
paid subscriber, whereby short run losses are incurred to get long run profits from captive 
customers.  Notice  that  these  could  eventually  be  additional  channels  through  which  the 
waterbed effect might manifest itself. 
 
5. Empirical analysis on the tariff structure and waterbed effect  
We now present the empirical results on the differential impact of the waterbed effect 
according to the tariff structure. Following the previous theoretical discussion, we examine in 
detail the impact of regulation of mobile termination rates on pre paid deals and post paid 
(monthly) contracts. When the regulation of termination rates affects all types of calls, both 
from fixed and from/to mobile networks, the waterbed effect is expected to be stronger for 
contracts, and weaker for pre paid deals. 
Table  3  presents  the  results.
17  The  data for  the  first four  columns consist  of  the  best 
possible deals for each user profile among all contracts available, both pre paid and post 
paid. This means that, for a given consumer profile, the tariff chosen is the cheapest overall 
for that profile, no matter whether a pre paid or post paid deal. 
                                                 
15 The Appendix (available from the authors upon request) contains a detailed description of these assumptions. 
16  The  only  alternative  cross country  data  available  is  the  Merrill  Lynch  dataset.  It  contains  aggregate 
information on total voice service based revenues for all the operators in a country. However, there are two key 
problems with this data. First, the revenue data includes also the revenues from termination rates. Second the 
total  revenue  is  a  very  aggregate  measure  of  “real  world”  behaviour  and  it  does  not  allow  like to like 
comparison of tariffs (as we cannot distinguish things like inclusive minutes, quantity discounts, etc.). These 
two problems pose some serious identification and endogeneity issues in examining the waterbed phenomenon. 
Finally, its aggregate nature does not allow researchers to distinguish between pre paid and post paid contracts 
and the likely channels through which the waterbed effect operates. 
17 All reported standard errors are based on a generalized White like formula, allowing for
 country operator 
usage level clustered heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Bertrand et al., 2004). 15 
 
Column (1) shows that the introduction of regulation had a significant positive effect on 
the total bill of post paid contracts. In line with the theory, we find evidence of a strong 
waterbed effect (the bill increases by 13.4% after the introduction of regulation over the 
period) which is very similar to the equivalent estimate of 13.3% reported in GV (Table 1, 
column (1)).
18 This is the increase in the total bill due to regulation of termination rates 
experienced  by  mobile  consumers  in  our  sample.  Then,  in  columns  (2)  and  (3),  we  run 
separate specifications using as dependent variables either the fixed fee (lnFixedujct) or the 
variable component (lnVoiceujct) of the multi part tariff of the monthly post paid contract 
respectively.  Results  from  these  two  columns  suggest  that  the  waterbed  phenomenon  is 
mainly caused by a change in the fixed rather than the variable component in these contracts. 
The impact of regulation on the fixed fee of post paid contracts is positive and strongly 
significant, whereas it is insignificant for the variable component. Hence, results on the post 
paid  contracts  of  the  best  deals  available,  reported  in  the  first  three  columns,  verify  the 
existence  and  magnitude  of  the  waterbed  phenomenon  and  seem  to  confirm  our  second 
hypothesis  (H2)  that,  if  M2M  prices  are  also  affected  by  regulation,  that  will  show  up 
particularly via a change in the fixed fee. 
 Column (4) reports the effect of regulation on the prices of the pre paid contracts of the 
best deals available in our sample. The estimated coefficient indicates the existence of an 
equally strong waterbed effect (11.4%). Although this is smaller than the one for post paid 
contracts (13.4%), their difference is insignificant,
19 not verifying in full our first hypothesis 
(H1).  
However, there are important reasons to believe that distinguishing more sharply between 
pre paid and post paid customers is important. Customers on long term contracts may be 
looking only at similar long term deals, and may not be interested in a temporary pre paid 
subscription, even if this turned out to be cheaper for a while. Switching among operators 
takes time and for a business user  this might  not be a  very realistic option, even in  the 
presence of number portability. Conversely, customers on pre paid cards may have budget 
constraints and do not want to commit to long term contracts where they would have to pay a 
fixed monthly fee for one or more years. Again, these customers may want to look only at 
offers among pre paid contracts. For these reasons, we also investigated whether there is a 
                                                 
18 The small difference between the two results stems from some differences in the sample size. For this paper 
we only look at monthly contracts that clearly have both a fixed and a variable component (voice), while we 
have excluded the contracts made of only a fixed component (e.g., contracts with unlimited or “all inclusive” 
bundled  offers)  as  the  theory’s  predictions  only  apply  to  pricing  plans  with  a  clear  fixed  and  variable 
component. 
19 F(1, 115) = 0.04, prob>F = 0.849. 16 
 
difference in the waterbed effect between pre paid and post paid users, when each type of 
user is limited in her choices exclusively within the same type of contracts. The last four 
columns in Table 3 examine the results for such “constrained” post paid (columns (5) (7)) 
and pre paid (column (8)) users.  
Column (5) confirms the existence of a strong waterbed reaction to regulation within 
post paid contracts: the total bill for monthly post paid contracts even increases by 15.9%. 
Columns (6) and (7) provide evidence that this overall effect stems mainly from a change in 
the fixed rather than the variable component of these contracts. This verifies again our earlier 
conclusion on the validity of the second hypothesis.  
Finally, column (8) indicates that regulation also had a positive impact on pre paid prices. 
However,  the  estimated  coefficient  is  not  significant  now  indicating  that,  when  looking 
within all pre paid deals in our sample, regulation had a more uncertain impact on average. 
Most importantly though, the magnitude of the waterbed effect (5.1%) for pre paid deals is 
significantly
20 smaller than the one for post paid contracts, confirming our first hypothesis. 
To the extent that one is prepared to accept that customers who typically subscribe to pre 
paid cards do not look around for post paid contracts, and vice versa, then the empirical 
results are in line with the theoretical predictions. 
Results are robust to the inclusion of other time varying regressors. During this period, 
many countries have licensed new operators, as new spectrum became available. Specifically, 
we  have  also  included  the  (log)  number  of  competitors  as  a  proxy  for  the  competitive 
intensity  in  each  market.  Our  main  results  remain  unchanged:
21  the  waterbed  effect  is 
stronger for post paid contracts and among post paid contracts, it operates via a change of the 
fixed component of the contract. The impact of competition on the customers’ bills is always 
negative and in most cases significant, in line with the intuition. Intriguingly, for post paid 
contracts,  the  total  effect  of  competition  comes  especially  via  a  reduction  of  the  voice 
component, and less from a reduction of the fixed fee which is negative but not significant. 
This is in line with Hoernig’s (2009) model, where, at least for the symmetric case, he finds 
that voice call prices decrease with the number of competing firms. In contrast, he also shows 
how  the  effect  on  the  fixed  fee  is  ambiguous  and  cannot  be  signed  in  general.  Most 
                                                 
20 F(1, 115) = 15.87, prob>F = 0.000. 
21 Results available from the authors upon request. We also experimented using the (log) of the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index, instead of the number of competitors, and results are essentially unchanged. We additionally 
experimented by adding market penetration as an additional time varying regressor. However, its impact was 
always statistically insignificant. 17 
 
significantly, though, these results confirm that waterbed channel effects are not confounded 
with any other important time varying variable. 
 
6. Dynamic effects on post- and pre-paid contracts 
Although both datasets seem to confirm our second hypothesis, the evidence in favour of 
the first hypothesis that the waterbed should be stronger for post paid contracts than pre paid 
deals is less clear cut. When we compared the effect of regulation on prices paid by the 
“constrained” post paid users to those paid by pre paid users (in columns (5) and (8) of Table 
3), there is an unambiguous difference in the level of the waterbed effect. The coefficient on 
regulation on pre paid deals is not statistically significant, implying that there is no waterbed 
effect on average for these contracts in our sample. According to the theory (see the second 
row in Table 1) this may indicate that the pure waterbed effect is exactly compensated by less 
“collusive” environment due to lower termination rates. We find this result quite stimulating 
and in this subsection we investigate the dynamic effects of regulation on prices for the two 
types of contracts.  
Economic intuition and market reality suggest that the effect of regulation on prices might 
not  be  instantaneous.  Termination  rates  are  typically  regulated  over  some  periods  using 
“glide paths”, in which charges are allowed to fall gradually towards a target over that period. 
This adjustment path is known and anticipated by operators. However, there could also be 
some inertia. For example, due to contract restrictions a significant part of consumers might 
be locked with an operator. In this case, the operator would not need to immediately adjust its 
price schedule, as the possibility of consumers switching to a different operator is small. 
Hence,  we  would  like  to  investigate  whether  firms  anticipated  regulation  (possibly  by 
strategically manipulating their prices before the actual implementation of the regulation) and 
indeed whether the effect of regulation was short lived (a one off event) or had any persistent 
long term effects.  
To  quantify  these  dynamic  effects  of  the  waterbed  phenomenon,  we  define  binary 
indicators for six, non overlapping, quarters around the introduction of regulation and a final 
binary  variable  isolating  the  long run  effect  of  regulation.  Our  specification  is  still  a 
difference in difference  model,  but  now  we  allow  for  flexible  time varying  effects  of 
regulation on prices for both types of contracts: 
 18 
 












jct = 1 in the third quarter before regulation, D
T 2
jct = 1 in the second quarter before 
regulation,  and  similarly  for  all  other  quarters  until  D
T+3
jct  =  1  in  the third  quarter  after 
regulation  and  in  all  subsequent  quarters.  Each  binary  indicator  equals  zero  in  all  other 
quarters than those specified. Hence, the base period is the time before the introduction of 
regulation, excluding the anticipation period (i.e., four quarters before regulation backwards). 
This approach accounts for probable anticipation effects (as captured by D
T 3 to D
T 1 binary 
indicators)  as  well  as  short   (captured  by  D
T  to  D
T+2)  and  long run  effects  (captured  by 
D
T+3).
22 We estimate this model separately for post  and pre paid deals using the same data as 
in columns (5) and (8) in Table 3, when each type of user is limited in her choices within the 
same type of contracts. 
Figure 1 plots the regression coefficients on these binary indicators from equation (7) 
together with their 95% confidence interval. Regression coefficients three quarters up to and 
including the date of regulation are insignificant indicating that regulation has no effect on 
prices before its introduction. It is the actual implementation of the regulation that has a 
significant impact on prices as revealed by the immediate increase on the coefficients just 
after regulation (waterbed at T+1: 18%). Regulation is binding right from the beginning and, 
as  it  tightens  up  over  time,  the  waterbed  effect  increases.  As  we  can  see  in  Figure  1, 
regulation  also  seems  to  have  a  large  and  very  significant  long run  waterbed  effect  (the 
coefficient estimate on D
T+3, which quantifies the effect of regulation on prices post the third 
quarter after its introduction). Most importantly, it emerges that mobile prices for post paid 
contracts seem to respond continuously with every tightening of the termination rates. 
Figure  2 plots  the  regression coefficients  together with their 95%  confidence interval 
from equation (7) for pre paid contracts. The dynamic effect for pre paid contracts is much 
more intriguing. As we can see, the inaction before the introduction of regulation is followed 
by a short lived (for period T) non significant decrease in prices and then a continuous non 
significant increase in prices for the next two quarters (periods T+1 and T+2). There is, 
however, an overall positive and significant long run waterbed effect on these prices too.
23 
Notice also the massive increase in the variance associated with these coefficients for pre 
paid  deals,  after  the  introduction  of  regulation.  Mobile  operators  seem  to  have  reacted 
                                                 
22 See Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) for a discussion of this approach. 
23 The coefficient on D
T+3 is around 17%. Note that this coefficient is not directly comparable to the previous 
estimates of the waterbed effect, as it incorporates the effect not only of the introduction of regulation, but also 
of the progressive tightening of termination rates. 19 
 
differentially  regarding  the  pricing  of  these  contracts  shortly  after  the  introduction  of 
regulation. At the beginning, they seem on average to reduce the prices charged to these 
customers,  possibly  trying  to  lure  customers  into  their  networks  (with  the  hope  of  them 
upgrading later to monthly subscribers) or potentially as a loss making, short term strategy 
against smaller firms that either remained unregulated or were not regulated at the same 
rates.
24 In addition, cuts in termination rates might have disrupted collusive equilibria as 
predicted by the literature on two way access charges and linear retail pricing strategies, 
initiating more turbulent periods of competition. In any case, the strong and positive long run 
coefficient  illustrates  that mobile  operators eventually abandoned any such strategies and 
raised the prices even for the pre paid customers, which is another manifestation of the power 
of the waterbed effect. 
The different behaviour between pre paid and post paid consumers could also be related 
to  other  micro phenomena that  we cannot directly test.  To the extent that pre paid  users 
receive fewer calls, termination rents from receiving calls would be less relevant for mobile 
operators and therefore the waterbed effect would play a much reduced role in determining 
their retail prices. However, anecdotal evidence seems to suggest the opposite, in that pre 
paid consumers predominantly use their phones for incoming calls, and therefore regulation 
of termination charges should induce a strong waterbed effect, but much diluted by their 
reduced collusive role, as we have argued above. 
On the usage side, fixed to mobile substitution could also have played a role, as some 
consumers do substitute more expensive F2M calls for cheaper M2M (especially if the latter 
are on net, when caller and recipient subscribe to the same mobile operator). This would 
mean that, as time progresses, the M2M effects should have gained increasingly more weight 
relative to the F2M effects of reduced termination rates (see Vogelsang, 2010). To the extent 
that this phenomenon was common both to pre paid and to post paid customers, our fixed 
effects would capture it. If instead it acted differentially, then one would need more micro 




                 
 
 
                                
24 These pricing strategies were making pre paid contracts the “best deals” overall in some quarters. This might 
also explain why we get such a strong waterbed effect on pre paid “best deals” in column (4) of Table 3 relative 




The identification of the bottleneck monopoly problem whenever a fixed line customer 
calls a mobile customer led to the introduction of regulation of termination rates in many 
countries,  with  the  principal  aim  of  reducing  the  prices  of  fixed to mobile  calls.  A 
consequence of this regulatory intervention was, ceteris paribus, the increase in the level of 
prices for mobile customers, also known as the waterbed effect. 
In  this  paper  we  re assess  the  waterbed  effect question,  taking  into  account  that  the 
overall impact of regulation of termination rates will balance both effects arising from fixed 
to mobile calls and mobile to mobile calls. While the first effect unambiguously should push 
up mobile retail prices, the latter is less clear, and  will  depend  on the type of tariff  the 
customers subscribe to. We summarize the large literature on access charges and network 
competition and we derive two testable implications: (i) that the waterbed effect would be 
stronger for post paid rather than pre paid contracts, and, (ii) that among post paid contracts, 
the waterbed effect should prevail particularly via a change of the fixed component of the 
contract. Our empirical analysis takes into account the structure of mobile tariffs and lends 
robust support for both hypotheses. 
These results have some important implications. To our knowledge, this is the first paper 
to derive and test hypotheses based on the literature on two way access prices. The empirical 
findings  strongly  corroborate  predictions  on  customers’  bills  obtained  directly  from 
theoretical  models.  The  evidence  presented  here  highlights  the  importance  of  indirect 
channels, whereby regulation affects the nature of the strategic interaction among operators. 
We therefore endorse the current use of theoretical models of network competition when, for 
instance,  deciding  on  the  optimal  regulation  of  termination  rates,  as  these  models  shape 
observable parameters in a way consistent with the data. 
The empirical literature to which we contribute, however, falls short of computing, from 
the data, what the optimal level of intervention should be, possibly because of the nature of 
these studies (cross country comparisons, rather than empirical structural models at a single 
country level with more detailed information especially about demand parameters). This is a 
fruitful area for future research. The waterbed effect points to a trade off between cheaper 
prices to those calling mobile phones and increased charge levels to mobile subscribers. The 
associated welfare changes should be estimated precisely in order to inform regulators and 
policy makers when they intervene. An alternative is to calibrate theoretical models with 
realistic demand and supply parameters (see Harbord and Hoernig, 2010). Given that this is 
the first attempt to bring some of the results of the two way access prices literature to data, 21 
 
there  is  large  room  for  improvement.  We  think  that  empirically  testing  more  theoretical 
predictions  is a fruitful avenue for  future  research. Mobile telephony is certainly  a good 
testing ground, but other two sided industry examples abound, such as video games, credit 
cards, internet advertising, internet portals, etc. Better understanding of these phenomena is a 
necessary ingredient towards building more elaborate structural models that would allow us 
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APPENDIX – DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
This  Appendix contains  a  detailed  data  description,  Table  A2  with  the  timing  of  the 
termination rate regulation and Table A3 with some robustness results.  
We  obtained  mobile  operator’s  prices  from  Teligen  (2002Q3 2006Q1),  which  reports 
quarterly information on the total bills paid by consumers across OECD countries based on 
three  usage  profiles  (high,  medium  and  low).  Teligen  calculates  these  total  bills  across 
countries and for each hypothetical usage profile so that they take into account registration or 
installation charges, monthly rental charges, a number of SMS messages per month and it 
also takes into consideration any inclusive minutes (or SMS messages) or call allowance 
value included in monthly subscriptions. For each of the operators covered, a set of packages 
is included so that the cheapest package offered by the operator can be calculated for each of 
the three usage profiles. In particular, the principles followed in calculating all baskets (high, 
medium and low) include: 
•  Registration or installation charges with 1/3 of the charges, i.e. distributed over 3 
years. 
•  Monthly rental charges, and any option charges that may apply to the package, or 
package combination. 
The call and message volumes for each usage profile are shown in the first two columns 
of Table A1. 
 
TABLE A1 – TELIGEN MOBILE BASKETS 
  Call and SMS 





























user  25  30  28%  14%  40%  18%  1.6  1.4  1.4 
Medium 
user  75  35  24%  12%  43%  21%  2.1  1.9  1.9 
High 
user  150  42  26%  14%  42%  18%  2.2  2.0  2.1 24 
 
 
Only national calls are included in the profiles, with four different destinations: 
•  Local area fixed line calls. This is used to accommodate the tariffs that have separate 
charges for the local area. When such charges are not available, this proportion of 
calls is included in the National. 
•  National fixed line calls. This covers all fixed line calls outside the local area, except 
in cases as noted above.  
•  Same network mobile calls (On net). This includes all calls made to mobiles in the 
same mobile network as the caller. 
•  Other network mobile calls (Off net). This includes calls to all other mobile networks 
in  the  caller’s  country.  When  the  charges  are  different  depending  on  destination 
network, the market shares based on subscribers are used for weighting the charges. 
The distributions per destination for each basket are shown in columns 3 6 of Table A1. 
A  further  split,  by  usage  profile,  is  made  in  terms  of  times  (peak/off peak)  and  days 
(weekdays/weekend), which is not reported for the sake of brevity. 
Three separate call durations are taken into account, respectively for local and national 
fixed line calls, same network mobile calls (On net), and other network mobile calls (Off 
net). Call durations for each basket are shown in the last three columns of Table A1. 
Any inclusive minutes are deducted from the basket usage before starting the calculation 
of usage cost. The inclusive minutes are assumed to be used up with the same calling pattern 
that is described in the basket, i.e., the same peak/off peak ratio and the same distribution 
across destinations. Where the inclusive minutes are clearly limited to specific destinations or 
times of day this will be taken into account. No transfer of unused minutes is taken into 
account. 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  information  reported  by  Teligen  does  not  include 
handset subsidies. 25 
 
 
TABLE A2 – REGULATION CHRONOLOGY 
   
Country  Year 
Poland
  1997Q1 
UK  1998Q1 
Belgium  1999Q2 
Austria  2000Q2 
Italy  2000Q2 
Japan  2000Q2 
Spain  2000Q2 
Norway  2001Q2 
Sweden  2001Q2 
Denmark  2001Q4 
Hungary
  2002Q1 
Portugal  2003Q4 
France  2004Q2 
Australia  2005Q2 
Czech Republic  2005Q2 
Germany  2005Q2 
Slovak Republic  2005Q2 
Switzerland  2005Q4 
Ireland  2006Q2 
Luxembourg  2006Q2 
New Zealand  2006Q2 
Turkey  2006Q2 
Netherlands  2006Q3 
Greece  2006Q4 
Notes: Counties in bold are the ones experienced a change in regulation during our sample. In 
contrast, countries in italics remain unregulated, whereas the rest of the countries were always 
regulated during our sample period using the Teligen price data.  
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TABLE A3 – TARIFF STRUCTURE AND WATERBED EFFECT   ROBUSTNESS  
                       
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)    (8) 
Estimation method  OLS  OLS  OLS    OLS    OLS  OLS  OLS    OLS 
Dependent variable  lnPujct  lnFixedujct  lnVoiceujct    lnPujct    lnPujct  lnFixedujct  lnVoiceujct    lnPujct 
                       
  Best deals 
(Monthly subscriptions) 
  Best deals 
(Pre paid) 
  Monthly subscriptions    Pre paid 








  0.118*** 
(0.041) 















   0.043 
(0.179) 






   0.070 
(0.176) 












yes  yes  yes 
 
yes 
Observations  468  468  468    499    718  718  718    1568 
Clusters  63  63  63    74    80  80  80    138 
Within R
2  0.382  0.174  0.428    0.161    0.361  0.184  0.409    0.147 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Teligen data (2002Q3 2006Q1) corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter (columns 1 4), deals available to post paid 
subscribers only (columns 5 7) and the deals available to pre paid customers only (column 8). In all cases the data has been restricted to post paid contracts that have both a 
variable and a fixed component and the variable component is larger than the fixed (for both pre paid and post paid subscribers). 
Notes: The dependent variable is either the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter for post paid subscriptions (columns 
1 and 5) or pre paid contracts (columns 4 and 8) or the logarithm of the PPP adjusted fixed fee (columns 2 and 6) or variable component (columns 4 and 7) paid by consumers 
with different usage at every quarter for post paid subscriptions. Information on the number of competitors was taken from the Global Wireless Matrix of Merrill Lynch, which 
is also available on a quarterly basis (2000Q1 2006Q1). All regressions include country operator usage and a full set of year binary indicators. Standard errors clustered (i.e. 
robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) at the country operator usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 Figure 1: The Evolution of the Waterbed Effect on Prices (post-paid contracts) 
 
Notes: Data from Teligen corresponding to the best post-paid (monthly) contracts available at every quarter. Figure 1 plots the 
regression coefficients from equation (7) for six, non-overlapping, binary variables around the introduction of regulation and a 
final binary variable isolating the long-run effect of regulation. Hence, the base period is the time before the introduction of 
regulation, excluding the anticipation period (i.e., four quarters before regulation backwards). The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. Confidence interval is based on 





 Figure 2: The Evolution of the Waterbed Effect on Prices (pre-paid contracts) 
 
Notes: Data from Teligen corresponding to the best pre-paid (pay-as-you-go) contracts available at every quarter. Figure 2 
plots  the  regression  coefficients  from  equation  (7)  for  six,  non-overlapping,  binary  variables  around  the  introduction  of 
regulation and a final binary variable isolating the long-run effect of regulation. Hence, the base period is the time before the 
introduction of regulation, excluding the anticipation period (i.e., four quarters before regulation backwards). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter. Confidence 
interval is based on standard errors clustered (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) at the 
country-operator-usage level. TABLE 1 – PREDICTIONS ON THE WATERBED EFFECT FOLLOWING AN 
INCREASE IN MOBILE TERMINATION RATES 
  F2M calls (pure 
waterbed) 
M2M calls 
(additional effect)  
Total Effect 
(Linear tariffs, i.e., 
pre-paid cards) 
     
Total bill  -  +  Ambiguous 
(Multi-part tariffs, i.e., 
post-paid contracts) 
     
No on-net/off-net 
discrimination 
     
Total bill  -  0  - 
Fixed fee  -  -  -- 
Variable part  0  +  Mildly + 
On-net/off-net 
discrimination 
     
Total bill  -  -  -- 
Fixed fee  -  --  --- 
Variable part  0  +  Mildly + 
 TABLE 2 – SUMMARY STATISTICS  
        Variable  Observations  Mean  Standard Deviation  Min  Max 
Teligen (Best deals) 
lnPujct  504  5.202  1.544  1.067  7.365 
lnFixedujct  504  3.454  1.808  -1.538  6.496 
lnVoiceujct  504  4.877  1.569  0.621  7.357 
Regulationjct  504  0.679  0.467  0  1 
lnPujct  545  4.944  1.440  0.114  7.492 
Regulationjct  545  0.563  0.496  0  1 
Teligen (Post-paid) 
lnPujct  792  5.142  1.540  0.888  7.551 
lnFixedujct  792  3.487  1.735  -1.538  6.496 
lnVoiceujct  792  4.802  1.579  0.258  7.357 
Regulationjct  792  0.654  0.476  0  1 
Teligen (Pre-paid) 
lnPujct  1670  5.554  1.688  0.114  7.989 
Regulationjct  1670  0.599  0.490  0  1 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Teligen data (2002Q3-2006Q1) corresponding to the best deals available at 
every quarter (first panel), deals available to post-paid monthly subscribers only (second panel) and deals available to 
pre-paid customers only (third panel). 
Notes: The first panel (Best deals) provides summary statistics on the key variables used in Table 3 (columns (1)-(4)), the 
second panel (Post-paid) provides similar information for the variables used in columns (5)-(7), and the third panel (Pre-
paid) provides summary statistics on the variables used in column (8). 
 TABLE 3 – TARIFF STRUCTURE AND WATERBED EFFECT  
                       
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) 
 
(5)  (6)  (7)    (8) 
Estimation method  OLS  OLS  OLS    OLS 
 
OLS  OLS  OLS    OLS 
Dependent 
variable  lnPujct  lnFixedujct  lnVoiceujct    lnPujct 
 
lnPujct  lnFixedujct  lnVoiceujct    lnPujct 
                       
  Best deals 
(Post-paid) 
  Best deals 
(Pre-paid) 
 
Post-paid contracts   
 
Pre-paid 
Waterbed Effect  13.4%        11.4% 
 

















  0.051 
(0.052) 












yes  yes  yes 
 
yes 
Observations  504  504  504    545 
 
792  792  792    1670 
Clusters  68  68  68    78 
 
88  88  88    147 
Within-R
2  0.361  0.158  0.415    0.147 
 
0.329  0.160  0.391    0.139 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Teligen data (2002Q3-2006Q1) corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter (columns (1)-(4)), deals available to 
post-paid subscribers only (columns (5)-(7)) and the deals available to pre-paid customers only (column (8)). In all cases the data has been restricted to post-paid contracts 
that have both a variable and a fixed component and the variable component is larger than the fixed (for both pre-paid and post-paid monthly subscribers). 
Notes: The dependent variable is either the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter for post-paid subscriptions 
(columns (1) and (5)) or pre-paid contracts (columns (4) and (8)) or the logarithm of the PPP adjusted fixed fee (columns (2) and (6)) or variable component (columns (4) 
and (7)) paid by consumers with different usage at every quarter for post-paid subscriptions. All regressions include country-operator-usage and a full set of year binary 
indicators. Standard errors clustered (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) at the country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis 
below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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